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Abstract 
 
The first in-flight failure of a primary structural component made from composite material on a 
commercial airplane led to the crash of American Airlines Flight 587.  As part of the National 
Transportation Safety Board investigation of the accident, the composite materials of the vertical 
stabilizer were tested, microstructure was analyzed, and fractured composite lugs that attached the 
vertical stabilizer to the aircraft tail were examined.  In this paper the materials testing and analysis is 
presented, composite fractures are described, and the resulting clues to the failure events are discussed. 
 
Introduction 
 
On November 12, 2001, shortly after taking off from Kennedy International Airport, the composite 
vertical stabilizer and rudder separated from the fuselage of American Airlines Flight 587, rendering 
the airplane uncontrollable.  The Airbus A300-600 airplane crashed into a neighborhood in Belle 
Harbor, New York, killing all 260 persons aboard the airplane and 5 persons on the ground.  This 
accident was unique partly in that it was the first time a primary structural component fabricated out of 
composite material failed in flight on a commercial airplane.  
As a result of the analysis of the facts learned during the course of the nearly 3-year long investigation 
of the accident, the National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the 
accident was, “the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate 
design that were created by the first officer’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs.  
Contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system 
design and elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program [1].”  
Analysis of the flight data recorder revealed the airplane had performed a series of yawing maneuvers 
in the seconds before separation of the vertical stabilizer, and the separation of the vertical stabilizer 
occurred while the airplane was pointed to the left of its flight path.  This orientation would have 
produced a bending moment on the vertical stabilizer leading to tension on the right-side attachments 
and compression on the left.  
The separated pieces of the vertical stabilizer and rudder were recovered away from the main crash site 
mainly from the water of Jamaica Bay.  The vertical stabilizer was largely intact, and had separated 
from the fuselage by fractures at the lower end where it had been connected to the fuselage.  Many 
fractured pieces of the rudder were recovered near, but mostly fractured from, the vertical stabilizer.  
Although a detailed examination of the rudder was completed during the accident investigation, 
performance analysis of the flight recorder data indicated that the rudder performed as designed 
through the accident sequence until the vertical stabilizer separated from the fuselage, and loads 
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analysis indicated that the vertical stabilizer would fail before the rudder.  Thus, the rudder failure was 
secondary to the failure of the vertical stabilizer.  As part of the overall investigation into the accident, 
the composite materials of the vertical stabilizer were examined and tested, and a detailed examination 
of the fractures in the vertical stabilizer was conducted in order to determine the failure mechanism and 
direction of fracture propagation where possible, including assessing the possibility of any pre-existing 
damage or fatigue cracking.  
Using accident loads derived from analysis of recorded flight data, three subcomponent tests were 
conducted on vertical stabilizer aft lugs from an unused skin panel and from another airplane.  Fracture 
patterns for these three test specimens were compared to the corresponding structure on the accident 
airplane.  
In this paper, the structure of the vertical stabilizer is described.  Next, results of the materials testing 
and microstructural examination are shown.  Then, fractography of the vertical stabilizer is presented, 
and the interpretation of the results toward understanding the failure is discussed.  Finally, 
fractographic examination results of the three subcomponent tests are presented and significance of the 
fracture features are discussed. 
Description of the Structure 
 
Development of the Airbus A300-600 model began in 1980, and certification occurred in 1984.  The 
vertical stabilizer and rudder for this model airplane had a symmetric airfoil shape.  The vertical 
stabilizer and rudder were 27 feet 3 inches tall.  From leading edge to trailing edge the width of the 
vertical stabilizer and rudder was 25 feet at the base and 10 feet 2 inches at the tip.  The accident 
airplane was delivered new in 1988 
Vertical Stabilizer Structure  
 
The vertical stabilizer design for the Airbus A300-600 series airplane is a stiffened box with removable 
leading edge fairings and trailing edge panels.  An internal view drawing of the vertical stabilizer is 
shown in Figure 1.  The stiffened box consists of two integrally stiffened skin panels for the left and 
right sides, spars for the forward and aft sides, and closure ribs at the upper and lower ends.  The 
integral stiffeners in the skin panels consist of 24 “I”-shaped stringers that extend spanwise parallel to 
the aft spar, numbered from the aft to forward.  Internal stiffeners for the box consist of a center spar at 
the lower end of the span and 16 ribs, not 
including the two closure ribs.  The ribs are 
numbered from the lower end upward starting 
with the lower closure rib.  The components of 
the box are riveted together, and the leading 
edge fairings and trailing edge panels are 
attached with threaded fasteners. 
Except for the fasteners, lightning protection 
strips, and trailing edge panel support frames, 
the vertical stabilizer is designed to be made 
entirely of composite materials.  The stiffened 
box of the vertical stabilizer is a solid carbon-
fiber reinforced polymer (CFRP) laminate 
composed of T300 carbon fibers in a CIBA 
913 epoxy matrix.  The laminate includes both 
unidirectional tape and eight-harness satin 
fabric layers in the construction.  The zero-
 
Figure 1:  Airbus A300-600 vertical stabilizer 
construction. 
degree fibers of the fabric and tape layers in the composite are oriented parallel to the stringers and the 
aft spar, which are at an angle of 33.3 degrees aft of vertical.  The leading edge fairings and the trailing 
edge panels for the vertical stabilizer are sandwich composites having a Nomex honeycomb core with 
glass-fiber reinforced polymer (GFRP) facesheets for the leading edge fairings and both GFRP and 
CFRP facesheets for the trailing edge panels. 
The main connections for attaching the vertical stabilizer 
to the fuselage are designed as six CFRP lugs (main lugs) 
on the lower end of the vertical stabilizer that connect by 
bolts approximately 2 inches in diameter to six metal 
clevis fittings on the fuselage.  A schematic view of the 
typical assembly cross-section is shown in Figure 2 
(drawing of lug cross-section).  After the assembly is 
cured during manufacturing, the lug attachment bolt 
holes are core-drilled out.  Three main lugs extend from 
the lower end of each of the two vertical stabilizer skin 
panels.  At the thickest point, the main lugs are 
approximately 1.62 inches, 2.48 inches, and 2.17 inches 
thick for the forward, center, and aft lugs, respectively.  
The aft lugs alone each have more than 170 layers 
composed of approximately 50 percent ±45-degree 
fabric, 25 percent 0/90-degree fabric, and 25 percent 0-
degree tape.  The thickness of each lug decreases as plies 
are dropped in the lug-to-skin transition area.  The skin 
layers are made of ±45-degree fabric.  The I-shaped 
stringers have 0-degree tape at the caps and ±45-degree 
fabric in the web.   
Each lug contains two separate pieces that are cured 
separately before the final assembly.  In the final 
assembly, the outer precured half is laid down, followed 
in order by the skin layers, the inner precured half, the 
compensation layers, the rib 1 attach flange, the stringer 
outer flange (tape) layers, and the stringer module layers.   
Six smaller composite lugs (transverse lugs) attach the 
vertical stabilizer to the fuselage by lateral yokes.  Two 
of these transverse lugs extend from the lower end of 
each of the three spar webs.  These lugs are 
approximately 0.47 inch thick. 
Materials Testing and Microstructural Examination 
 
The materials testing and microstructural examination of samples of the accident vertical stabilizer 
were completed primarily at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Langley Research 
Center (NASA Langley) in Hampton, Virginia.  Some testing and microscopy were completed at the 
Airbus Industrie’s composites technology division in Bremen, Germany.  Details of the materials 
characterization and testing are provided in reference 2. 
Samples were selected from multiple locations on the vertical stabilizer for materials testing and 
microscopic examination to determine chemical composition, extent of cure, glass transition 
temperature (Tg), fiber and void volume fractions, and ply stacking sequence (layup).  On the right side 
 
 
Figure 2:  Drawing of main lug 
cross-section. 
skin panel, four samples were cut from undamaged areas near the aft spar plus two samples were cut 
from damaged areas in the forward and aft lower attachment lugs.  On the left side skin panel, three 
samples were cut from undamaged areas near the forward spar and one sample was cut from a 
damaged area near the left forward lug.  One sample each from the forward, center, and aft spar, and 
from ribs 1 and 3 were cut from undamaged areas.  Testing of samples from each area included 
differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) and infrared spectroscopy (IR).  Samples from one area were 
tested using dynamic mechanical analysis (DMA) and modulated differential scanning calorimetry 
(MDSC).  The fiber volume fraction, void volume fraction, and layup in each area were determined 
using microscopic examination of polished cross-sections.   
The curing temperature for the CFRP was specified to be 250 degrees Fahrenheit.  According to 
Airbus material qualification data, the onset glass transition temperature (Tg-onset) was 144 degrees 
Celsius in the dry condition and was 122 degrees Celsius after exposure to a climate of 50 percent 
relative humidity (corresponding to a moisture content of 0.7 weight percent).  According to the 
engineering drawings, the fiber volume fraction for the CFRP was 60% ± 4%.  The maximum volume 
fraction porosity permitted in the cross-section was 2.5 percent.   
The chemical composition of samples from each area was assessed using IR spectroscopy, measuring 
total attenuated reflectance through a microscope.  The results were typical for this composite material 
with no significant variances in the spectra for each specimen. 
The extent of cure and the Tg of the sample from the upper end of the right skin panel (sample RS4) 
were analyzed using MDSC, DMA, and DSC.  Portions of sample RS4 were tested in the as-received 
condition and after drying.  The moisture content for the as-received condition was approximately 0.58 
percent.  The MDSC results showed an average residual heat value of 4.5 joules per gram, which 
corresponded to an extent of cure greater than 97 percent.  The DMA results show that in the as-
received condition, the Tg-onset measured 134 degrees Celsius, which was between the qualification 
values of 144 degrees Celsius for the dry condition and 122 degrees Celsius for the 50 percent relative 
humidity (0.7 percent moisture content) condition.  The portion of sample RS4 that was tested in the 
dry condition had a Tg-onset of 149 degrees Celsius. 
The extent of cure and the Tg of each sample, including sample RS4, was assessed using DSC.  No 
significant variance was observed in the results among all the samples.  Results indicated that the 
extent of cure for each sample was sufficient. 
Sections of each sample were 
cut, mounted, and polished for 
microstructural examination 
and quantitative analysis.  The 
cross-sections from the 
vertical stabilizer were 
prepared and analyzed at 
NASA Langley and at Airbus 
Industrie.  A typical cross-
sectional view is shown in 
Figure 3 for a sample from the 
lower end of the right skin 
panel (sample RS1).  The 
cross-section shown is in a 
plane oriented parallel to the 
plus or minus 45-degree fiber 
direction.  Fiber and void 
 
Figure 3:  Microstructure of sample RS1. 
two 45-degree 
fabric layers 
two zero-degree 
tape layers 
stringer outer 
flange layers 
(zero-degree 
tape) 
content were determined using computer optical image analysis of polished micrographs.  The layup in 
each sample was determined from optical micrographs of the specimens that were assembled into 
mosaics such as that of Figure 3. 
Results of the microstructural examination and analysis indicated that the composite structure of the 
vertical stabilizer was constructed to the desired fiber volume fraction with acceptable void content.  
No evidence of microcracking was observed.  The observed layups were compared to the engineering 
drawings obtained from the manufacturer, and among the 15 samples, only one sample from the right 
forward lug (sample RF4) showed any discrepancies.  Within the 124 layers of sample RF4, 2 layers 
had orientations that were different from the drawing.  Also, two layers appeared to be missing from 
one position through the thickness, but two additional layers were present at another position.  The 
total number of layers for each orientation in sample RF4 was correct, and the discrepancies 
represented a small fraction of the total number of layers. 
Fractographic Examination Procedures and Challenges 
 
For most common airplane structural metals, visual inspection or low-power magnification is often 
sufficient to determine fracture mechanism and direction.  For metals, the fracture plane, surface 
roughness, radial marks, chevrons, shear lips, and general deformation when present all provide 
macroscopic clues to the fracture mechanisms, direction of fracture propagation, and relative motion of 
mating surfaces.  Preexisting cracks in metals often show staining or changes in color associated with 
corrosion [3].  Using these clues, large areas of damaged structure can be examined relatively quickly 
by an experienced investigator to identify fracture origins and areas requiring closer inspection.   
The fractographic examination of the composite fractures in the accident vertical stabilizer presented a 
challenge in that it was more extensive than would typically be required for an overstress fracture of a 
similar metal structure.  Visual clues to preexisting fractures, such as flat fracture features with curving 
boundaries or staining from corrosion that can be readily observed in structural metals, generally are 
not readily visible in composites.  Furthermore, the visual cues to fracture propagation directions that 
are sometimes apparent in composite structures, such as crack branching in translaminar fractures 
(fractures that break fibers) or banding in delaminations (fractures between layers), were not apparent 
in many of the fractures of interest.  In determining the failure mechanism and directions in the vertical 
stabilizer and rudder during the accident investigation, fine fracture features were examined at high 
magnification across relatively large areas of the fracture surfaces in order to determine fracture 
mechanisms and propagation directions, a time-consuming process for the failure investigation.  
However, since fatigue fractures and other preexisting cracks may appear similar during a macroscopic 
examination, the detailed inspection using high magnification was required to complete the 
fractographic analysis.   
The fractographic examination of the translaminar fractures and delaminations of the vertical stabilizer 
and rudder incorporated visual examination and scanning electron microscopy (SEM).  The visual 
examination included the documentation of the macroscopic fracture features.  The documentation 
included mapping of fractures, which could be used to aid in identifying fracture propagation 
directions from crack branching patterns.  Also, macroscopic indications of translaminar fracture under 
tension or compression were documented.  On delaminations, surfaces were examined for changes in 
reflectivity, which could indicate changes in fracture mechanism or mode [4].  However, for most of 
the fracture surfaces, SEM was required to determine the fracture mechanism and fracture propagation 
direction. 
SEM examination of translaminar fracture surfaces was used to determine the fracture mechanism and 
propagation directions, and SEM examination of delamination surfaces was used to identify the layers 
involved, fracture mechanisms, modes of fracture, and propagation directions.  Additionally, results of 
the examination were used to check the construction against the manufacturing drawings and to 
determine how the fractures related to the loading of the overall structure.   
Over 300 SEM photographs were taken of translaminar fractures in the main attachment areas of the 
vertical stabilizer, and more than 150 square inches of delamination surface areas were examined at 
high magnification.  Examined fracture surfaces were coated with a conductive layer of gold and 
palladium.  For translaminar fractures intersecting the lug attachment hole, the entire fracture surfaces 
were examined at high magnification, and for translaminar fractures above the lug holes, several inches 
of the fracture were examined at high magnification.  Samples for the SEM examination of the 
delamination surfaces were typically approximately two inches square and were taken from widely 
spaced areas on the exposed fracture surfaces in an effort to identify the overall trends.  Samples were 
also taken across areas where the delamination surface morphology changed (mostly as a result of the 
ends of plies in the lay-up) to explore for local differences in stress state or crack propagation 
direction.  Two samples, one from each of the two large delaminations, were not cleaned and were the 
first ones examined in order to explore the surface for matrix rollers, which would have been an 
indication of fatigue [5].  Since uncleaned samples were covered in debris, all other fracture surfaces 
were ultrasonically cleaned in water before coating.   
Another challenge for the fractographic analysis was the relatively small amount of fractographic 
reference material dealing specifically with fabric-reinforced composites.  Most of the literature 
describing fractography of composites focused on unidirectional tape lay-ups.  However, fabrics have 
unique characteristics that lead to features such as more variation in resin content on delamination 
surfaces and less fiber pullout in translaminar fractures relative to tape-reinforced materials.  The 
presence of woven fabric in the construction led to some interesting phenomena that could be useful in 
better analyzing composites failures.  In the unidirectional lay-ups, river marks were typically only 
observed in Mode I loading.  However, in the fabric construction, river marks also could be found in 
matrix-rich areas in the vicinity of the bundle crossings, and could be seen in the base of hackles in the 
transition from a bundle at one orientation to a perpendicular crossing bundle.  The river marks in the 
matrix-rich bundle crossings were used to identify a general direction of fracture propagation upward 
and aftward for both of the large delaminations (at the forward left and aft left attachments).  The use 
of the river marks at the base of the hackles was explored in the examination of the delaminations at 
the forward right lug.  As composites with fabric reinforcements are being increasingly used in 
airplane structures, more research is needed in characterizing these fracture surfaces generated under 
controlled laboratory conditions to 
assist the failure analyst in 
interpreting fractographic details. 
Fracture Surface Observations and 
Discussion 
 
The vertical stabilizer was largely 
intact with no significant areas of skin 
buckling.  An overall view of the 
vertical stabilizer as it was being 
recovered from the water of Jamaica 
Bay is shown in Figure 4.  At the 
lower end, each of the six attachment 
locations were separated either by 
fractures that intersected the lug 
attach hole or by fractures through the 
 
Figure 4:  Vertical stabilizer as recovered from Jamaica Bay. 
structure above the hole.  A schematic drawing of the lower end of the vertical stabilizer is shown in 
Figure 5, where a general fracture location for each lug is shown with overall views of each of these 
lug fractures.  Portions of rib 1, the rib 1 rib-to-skin attach angle, and the lower end of the forward spar 
also were fractured.  Along the trailing edge, the trailing edge panels were damaged in several 
locations.  A more detailed description of the damage is presented in reference 6. 
Description of main lug fractures 
 
The right aft, right forward, and left forward main lugs had translaminar fractures that intersected the 
attachment hole, and the remaining three main lugs had translaminar fractures in the structure above 
the lug.  Each of the lugs had delaminations in the lug area and/or in the structure above the lug.  
Details of the fractographic examination are presented in references 7 and 8.  Some of the 
delaminations extended into the main portion of the vertical stabilizer, and the extents of these 
delaminations were determined using nondestructive inspection (NDI), including ultrasonic inspection 
and x-ray-computed tomography scanning and imaging.  Results of the NDI of the vertical stabilizer 
are presented in references 9 and 10. 
Figure 5:  Overall views of main lug fractures with relative locations on vertical stabilizer. 
Macroscopic fracture features 
 
The main lug translaminar fractures on the right side of the vertical stabilizer generally had rough 
fracture features consistent with overstress fracture in primarily tensile loading.  Delaminations were 
observed at the edges of each of the lugs on the right side.  The extent of the delaminations as 
determined using NDI was limited to within the fractured lugs or within approximately four inches of a 
translaminar fracture. 
The right aft lug failed by 
translaminar fracture 
through the bolt hole as 
shown in Figure 6.  The 
translaminar fracture 
surfaces had a rough 
appearance consistent with 
fracture primarily under 
tensile loading.  Fractures on 
each leg of the lug were on 
different translaminar 
planes, and the change in 
planes occurred near the 
center of the lug thickness.  
On the aft side of the bolt 
hole, the outboard side of 
the fracture was in a plane 
nearly perpendicular to the 
zero-degree fiber direction, 
and the inboard side of the 
fracture was in a plane 
approximately parallel to the 
45-degree fiber direction.  On the forward side of the bolt hole, the outboard side of the fracture was in 
a plane approximately parallel to the zero-degree fiber direction, and the inboard side of the fracture 
was in a plane nearly parallel to rib 1.  Bearing damage was observed at the bore surface near both 
fracture surfaces, as indicated by white unlabeled arrows in Figure 6. 
The right center lug failed above the bolt hole in the lug-to skin transition above rib 1.  Translaminar 
fracture features were relatively rough, consistent with overstress fracture under tensile loading. 
Fractures on the right forward lug intersected the lug hole.  Translaminar fracture features were 
relatively rough, consistent with overstress fracture under tensile loading.  Some evidence of local 
compressive loading was observed near the aft side of the lug, indicating that fracture first occurred at 
the forward side of the lug, and then the lower ligament hinged about the aft side of the lug. 
The main lug translaminar fractures on the left side of the vertical stabilizer also generally had rough 
fracture features consistent with overstress fracture in primarily tensile loading, but they also showed 
indications of bending to the left.  The left forward lug had multiple delaminations in the lug area and 
an impression on the left side corresponding to contact with the fuselage attachment clevis.  The 
impression indicates the left skin panel of the vertical stabilizer bent to the left, damage that can only 
be explaned if the right side skin panel was already separated from the fuselage.  The left forward lug 
also had a delamination extending upward into the structure up to 43 inches from the lower end.  The 
left center lug had an area with compression fracture features at the outboard side of the translaminar 
 
Figure 6:  Right aft lug translaminar fractures (pictured from below 
the lug). 
fracture, consistent with bending loads to the left.  The left aft lug had delaminations extending up to 
37 inches from the lower end.  Multiple delaminations through the thickness were present in the lug-to-
skin transition area, allowing most of the precured halves of the lug to separate from the rest of the 
structure.   
Microscopic fracture features 
 
On translaminar fractures, the ends of 
some fibers were oriented roughly 
perpendicular to the fracture plane.  A 
typical SEM view of these fiber ends on 
one of the translaminar fracture surfaces 
is shown in Figure 7.  Fiber ends such as 
those shown in Figure 7 were examined 
using SEM to help determine the fracture 
mechanism and propagation direction.  
For fibers having radial patterns 
indicative of tensile fracture, the local 
fracture propagation direction could be 
determined from the direction of the 
radial pattern of several fibers [11, 12].  
Then, general directions of fracture 
propagation for the translaminar fractures 
could be determined by averaging the 
directions indicated by the radial patterns 
across many areas of the fracture 
surfaces.  Also, since fatigue and 
overstress fractures can appear similar from a macroscopic view, the microscopic examination of the 
fracture surfaces included looking for evidence of fatigue such as rounded edges on fiber ends [13] or 
striations in the matrix [5, 12, 14], however, no evidence of fatigue was observed on any of the 
translaminar fracture surfaces. 
At high magnification, fiber end fractures for fibers 
oriented perpendicular to the fracture plane generally 
showed radial fracture features consistent with fracture 
under tensile loading.  In an area near the outboard 
surface of the left center lug, fiber ends showed chop 
marks (lines across the fractured fiber ends), indicative of 
local compressive loading. Examples of these chop marks 
can be seen in Figure 8 on the fiber ends marked with a 
“C”.  The combination of tension on the inside edge and 
compression on the outboard surface is associated with an 
overall lug bending to the left. Using the radial patterns 
on the lug translaminar fractures, fracture propagation 
directions were determined to be extending from the lug 
holes for the right aft, right forward, and left forward lugs 
(all lugs that had fractures intersecting the lug hole).  For 
the right center lug, fracture propagated from aft to 
forward, and for the left center and left aft lugs, fracture 
propagated from forward to aft. 
 
Figure 7:  Fractured carbon fibers showing crack 
growth directions. 
 
Figure 8:  Fractured carbon fibers 
showing compression chop marks (C). 
 
13 µm 
Samples of the delamination fracture 
surfaces were examined in the scanning 
electron microscope to determine the 
orientation of the shear stress at the 
fracture and to identify the direction of 
crack propagation.  Fracture features that 
were used to make these determinations 
included hackles (thin plates of fractured 
matrix material between fibers oriented 
perpendicular to the fiber axis, with free 
edges that point in a general direction 
opposite to the local shear applied at the 
fracture surface) [15, 16] and river marks 
(related to the initiation of matrix cracks 
that coalescence into larger cracks, 
indicating the direction of propagation) 
[4].  A typical view of hackles and river 
marks observed on one of the 
delaminations is shown in Figure 9.  The 
samples also were carefully examined for indications of fatigue crack propagation, such as striations in 
the fiber impressions in the matrix [5, 12], matrix rollers (pieces of fractured matrix material rolled into 
cylindrical shapes by the relative motion of the fracture surface during cyclic loading) [5, 12], or 
rubbed hackle formations [5], however no evidence of fatigue was observed on any of the delamination 
surfaces. 
When hackles form in CFRP’s, the hackles orient perpendicular to the fiber axes, so the hackles in the 
orthogonal bundles of the woven fabric would generally point in two orthogonal directions.  In some 
cases, the superimposed imprints of unidirectional tape at 45° to those bundles also added hackles at a 
third direction.  Hackles also point generally opposite the locally applied shear at the fracture surface, 
so the multiple orientations of hackles from the different fiber bundles bound the direction of the local 
shear within an angle of 90°.   
River marks were observed in matrix-rich areas in the vicinity of the bundle crossings, and could be 
seen in the base of hackles in the transition from a bundle at one orientation to a perpendicular crossing 
bundle.  The river marks in the matrix-rich 
bundle crossings were used to identify a 
general direction of fracture propagation 
upward and aftward for both of the large 
delaminations (at the forward left and aft left 
attachments).  The use of the river marks at the 
base of the hackles to determine delamination 
growth direction was explored in the 
examination of the delaminations at the 
forward right lug. 
At the matrix-rich areas where bundles 
crossed, some porosity was observed having a 
somewhat angular appearance as shown in 
Figure 10.  These pores were identified as 
arising from excess curing agent that had 
crystallized within the matrix.  Such crystals 
 
Figure 9:  Delamination fracture features. 
 
Figure 10:  Porosity in matrix rich regions where 
bundles cross. 
130 µm 
could have been physically removed in the fracture process or dissolved by the water from which the 
vertical stabilizer was recovered. 
On the delamination surfaces at the left forward lug, hackles on average pointed downward and 
forward on the outboard side of the delamination and upward and aft on the mating side, indicating a 
shear direction consistent with fracture under tensile loading and/or bending to the left.  River patterns 
coalesced upward and aft, indicating crack propagation extending upward from the lower end.   
On the delamination surfaces at the left aft lug, hackles on average pointed downward and forward on 
the side of the delamination associated with the lug layers, and on average pointed upward and aft on 
the mating sides, consistent with the lug pieces moving downward relative to the remaining structure.  
In the portion of the delamination above the lug-to-skin transition, hackles generally pointed 
downward and forward on the outboard side and upward and aft on the mating side, indicating a shear 
direction consistent with fracture under bending to the left.  River patterns generally coalesced upward 
and aft, indicating crack propagation extending upward from the lower end.  No evidence of fatigue, 
such as striations in the matrix or edge rounding of the fiber ends on the translaminar fracture surfaces 
or matrix rollers or striations on the delamination surfaces, was observed on any of the fractures. 
A summary of the observed fracture patterns is shown in 
Figure 11.  The schematic drawing represents a horizontal 
cross-section of the vertical stabilizer through the main 
attachment lugs as viewed from above.  Lug cross-sections 
with a light band at the center represent the lugs that failed 
through the bolt hole.  Solid lug cross-sections represent 
fractures above the bolt holes.  Arrows on the lug surfaces 
indicate the approximate direction of fracture observed on 
the translaminar surface.  On the left center lug, the area of 
compression fracture features near the outboard side is 
indicated. The results showed that the failure pattern of 
fracture in tension on the right side was consistent with an 
overall bending of the vertical stabilizer to the left.  On the 
left side, the failure pattern of tension and bending to the left 
was consistent with an overall bending of the vertical 
stabilizer to the left after fracture of the lugs on the right 
side. 
It was noted that the only compression translaminar failure 
features were present on the vertical stabilizer at the 
outboard side of the center aft lug.  Typically, composites 
have less strength in compression than tension.  However, 
the design of the vertical stabilizer was such that the 
magnitude of the load needed to fail a lug in tension was less 
than the load needed to fail the lug in compression.  
Furthermore after failure of the lugs on the right side, the curvature of the panel would cause tension 
loading in the forward and aft lug and compression in the center lug with continued bending to the left.  
Other unknown factors, such as changes in air loading as the vertical stabilizer deflected after the 
initial fractures on the right side, would further influence the failure patterns on the left side. 
Subcomponent Tests 
 
Structural analysis indicated that under accident loading conditions, fracture of the vertical stabilizer 
would have initiated at the right aft lug.  Three aft lugs were obtained for mechanical testing under 
 
Figure 11:  Main lug fracture pattern 
summary (viewed from above). 
applied loads that were derived from recorded flight data from the accident.  The lug for the first test 
was obtained from a production left skin panel that had sections cut from it for destructive testing, but 
the aft lug had been left undisturbed.  The lugs for the second and third tests were obtained from a 
vertical stabilizer that had been removed from service after experiencing loads exceeding design limit 
loads.  The three vertical stabilizer aft lug specimens were tested at Airbus Industrie under National 
Transportation Safety Board supervision in a loading fixture that applied prescribed forces and 
moments to the lugs.  Testing of each lug continued until a load change associated with a translaminar 
fracture or crack was observed.  The fracture loads for these three tests were consistent with calculated 
accident loads and with earlier tests completed by Airbus Industrie during certification.  Details of the 
test procedures and results are documented in references 17-21.  A fractographic examination of each 
of the lugs was conducted after completing the tests as documented in reference 22. 
Before testing, each lug was examined for non-visible defects or damage using ultrasonic inspection.  
Results of these inspections are documented in reference 22.  No defects were observed in the first test 
lug.  Some damage was detected in the second and third test lugs near the lug attachment hole and in 
some areas in the lug fitting assembly transition area above the lowermost rib, however these lugs had 
experienced in-service loads exceeding design limit loads.  Following the tests, the lugs were examined 
again using ultrasonic inspection.  The post-testing ultrasonic inspection showed that the preexisting 
damage in these lugs grew in size during the testing. 
Overall views of the lugs from each test are shown in Figure 12 (outboard surface view).  A similar 
view of the accident right aft lug also is shown in Figure 12.  Unlabeled red arrows indicate where 
translaminar cracks or fractures intersected the outboard surfaces of the lugs, and an unlabeled large 
green arrow indicates loading direction (the force vector for the horizontal and vertical loading 
components for each lug).  The lugs from the first and second tests were left aft lugs, and as such, the 
orientations are mirror images of the accident right aft lug and the third test lug. 
Results from the 
fractographic 
examination showed 
that fractures in the 
test lugs occurred at 
locations similar to 
those on the accident 
right aft lug.  In the 
first test, loading was 
interrupted after a 
translaminar crack 
occurred at the 
location indicated by 
the red arrow in the 
upper right photo in 
Figure 12.  The 
translaminar fracture 
was located at a 
position on the 
forward part of the 
lug in a plane nearly 
parallel to the resultant force direction, similar to one of the translaminar fractures in the accident right 
aft lug.  Fracture features for the lugs from tests 2 and 3 were similar to each other.  The outboard side 
of each of these lugs had a translaminar fracture on the forward sides of the holes in a plane nearly 
 
Figure 12:  Aft lugs from accident and subsequent subcomponent tests. 
parallel to the loading direction and another translaminar fracture at the aft side of the hole in a plane 
approximately perpendicular to the loading direction, fractures similar to that of the accident lug.  In 
addition on the outboard sides, a compression buckling fracture was observed on the forward sides of 
each lug above the fracture parallel to the loading direction, which is different from features on the 
accident lug but was attributed to constraints of the loading fixture.  On the inboard sides of lugs 2 and 
3, fracture locations were on translaminar planes different from that of the outboard side of the lug.  
This change in fracture planes was similar to that of the accident right aft lug. 
A delamination was present within the first test lug having an extent similar to that of the accident right 
aft lug and in a location through the thickness slightly outboard of that of the accident right aft lug.  
Delaminations also were detected above the translaminar fractures in lugs 2 and 3.  In lugs from tests 2 
and 3, the locations of the delaminations through the thickness were similar to that of the accident right 
aft lug, but the extents of the delaminations in the test lugs were slightly less. 
Each subcomponent test lug had translaminar fractures that intersected the lug hole and had 
delaminations that were located within the lug, features similar to the accident right aft lug.  Each lug 
had a translaminar fracture at the forward lower side of the hole on the outboard side of the lug, 
including the first test, which was interrupted and had no other translaminar fractures.  The fracture at 
the forward lower side of the hole corresponds to one of the translaminar fracture locations on the 
accident lug.  The second test lug showed changes in translaminar fracture planes that were 
qualitatively similar to that of the accident right aft lug.  These results indicated that the accident right 
aft lug had fracture features consistent with being the first lug fracture from a substantially intact 
vertical stabilizer and rudder under accident load conditions. 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The materials testing and microstructural examination of the vertical stabilizer indicated the vertical 
stabilizer’s composite material had sufficient cure, desired fiber volume fraction, and acceptable void 
content with no evidence of microcracking in the areas examined.  Discrepancies representing a small 
fraction of the total number of layers were observed in the layup of one of the samples.  However, 
throughout the testing and examination, no deviations from the original design and materials 
specifications were found that would have contributed to the vertical stabilizer separation. 
The fractographic examination revealed no evidence of pre-existing damage or fatigue cracking in the 
vertical stabilizer, supporting the conclusion that the separation of the vertical stabilizer was a result of 
high aerodynamic loads.  The fractographic results of examination of the main attachment lugs for the 
vertical stabilizer showed that failures on the right side of the vertical stabilizer were overstress failures 
under tension loading, consistent with an overall bending of the vertical stabilizer to the left.  
Fractographic results for the main lugs on the left side of the vertical stabilizer showed overstress 
failure in tension and bending to the left, consistent with bending of the vertical stabilizer to the left 
after failure of the main lugs on the right side.  The structural analysis of the vertical stabilizer also 
conducted as part of the overall investigation indicated that under accident loads, fracture of the 
vertical stabilizer would initiate at the right aft main lug, which was consistent with the fractographic 
analysis. 
The failure mode in the accident was further confirmed by a series of three aft lug subcomponent tests.  
The failure loads for these three tests were consistent with predicted failure loads and with earlier tests 
completed by Airbus Industrie during certification.  Fracture patterns for the three test specimens were 
compared to the corresponding structure on the accident airplane, and good correlation was observed. 
The analysis of the fractographic evidence was incorporated into the overall analysis of the accident.  
As one of the findings of the Safety Board’s report stated, “Flight 587’s vertical stabilizer performed in 
a manner that was consistent with its design and certification.  The vertical stabilizer fractured from the 
fuselage in overstress, starting with the right rear lug while the vertical stabilizer was exposed to 
aerodynamic loads that were about twice the certified limit load design envelope and were more than 
the certified ultimate load design envelope [1].” 
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